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COMMERCIAL AND CORPORATE LAW
OVERVIEW
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ana-
lyzed a variety of issues within the scope of commercial and corporate
jurisprudence. The court considered tort claims arising from competi-
tive takeover bids,I the applicability of "force majeure" clauses, 2 and the
preemptive nature of federal copyright statutes. 3 In the sphere of cor-
porate governance, the Tenth Circuit discussed piercing the corporate
veil,4 and post-dissolution liability for criminal acts committed by corpo-
rations and partnerships.5 Cases in the banking area resulted in a dis-
cussion regarding the subtle distinctions between a bank and a "non-
bank" bank, 6 and limitations on the use of the ultra vires defense by bank
officers. 7 This article will examine these significant Tenth Circuit
decisions.
I. CLAIMS OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND WITH
PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS ADVANTAGE PROVIDE No PROTECTION
TO TAKEOVER BIDDERS OUTDONE BY COMPETITIVE
TENDER OFFERS
R-G Denver, Ltd. v. First City Holdings of Colorado, Inc. ,8 involved com-
peting efforts to purchase the assets of the Denver Real Estate Invest-
ment Association ("DREIA"), a business trust with assets consisting of
real and personal property. 9 R-G Denver was a limited partnership
formed for the purpose of acquiring the assets of DREIA. First City
Holdings was a corporation that owned, together with other parties, ap-
proximately six percent of DREIA's stock.' 0 Like R-G Denver, First City
Holdings was interested in taking control of DREIA. 1
A. Factual Background
On July 17, 1980, R-G Denver entered into a contract with DREIA
to purchase DREIA's assets for $42,540,000.12 The value of this offer to
1. R-G Denver, Ltd. v. First City Holdings of Colorado, Inc., 789 F.2d 1469 (10th
Cir. 1986).
2. International Minerals and Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir.
1985).
3. Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.denied, 107 S. Ct. 86 (1986).
4. Inryco, Inc. v. CGR Bldg. Sys., 780 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1986); and McCulloch Gas
Transmission Co. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 768 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1985).
5. United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 776 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v. Fed. Reserve Bd., 776 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1986).
7. Ries Biologicals, Inc. v. Bank of Santa Fe, 780 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986).
8. 789 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1986).
9. Id. at 1471.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1472.
12. Id. at 1471.
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DREIA shareholders was $32.00 per share, with a possibility for $34.00
per share if certain conditions were met.
1 3
The agreement specifically required: 1) that a majority of DREIA
shareholders approve the takeover at a meeting called for that purpose;
2) that DREIA pursue favorable tax rulings from the Internal Revenue
Service; and 3) that DREIA consult with R-G Denver's counsel when
preparing the necessary proxy materials. 14 If shareholder approval was
not obtained by October 15, 1980, the contract provided that either
party could terminate the agreement by providing written notice; other-
wise, termination would automatically occur on December 31, 1980.15
On August 12, 1980, First City Holdings filed a Schedule 13D 16
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, indicating that it had ac-
quired over five percent of DREIA's common stock and that it might be
interested in obtaining control of DREIA or its assets. On September
15, 1980, First City Holdings informed DREIA of its intention to make a
tender offer at $35.00 per share. 17 First City Holdings withdrew its
tender offer on September 18, 1980, but two weeks later offered $36.00
per share for DREIA's assets with terms similar to those proposed by
R-G Denver.' 8 In light of these developments, the DREIA trustees con-
cluded that updated proxies should be solicited. The October fifteenth
shareholders' meeting was therefore adjourned to a later date (January
6, 1981), and no vote was taken on the pending R-G Denver proposal. 19
Shortly thereafter, First City Holdings increased its offer to $37.15
per share. 20 Proxies were again sent out, the DREIA board announced
its support for this new offer, and, at a price of $37.15 per share, First
City Holdings was able to acquire nearly 80% of the outstanding DREIA
shares. 2 1 Then, at the rescheduled shareholders' meeting on January 6,
1981, First City Holdings, now in control of DREIA, abstained from vot-
ing on R-G Denver's proposed acquisition. As a result, that plan was not
approved.
2 2
In its suit, R-G Denver first asserted that First City Holdings tor-
tiously interfered with a contract by making bad faith tender offers for
the sole purpose of manipulating the fiduciary duties of DREIA's trust-
ees. 23 The trial court, 24 relying on Great Western Producers Cooperative v.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1472.
16. Id. A Schedule 13D is required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission when any entity acquires more than 5% beneficial ownership of a company. The
schedule must be filed within 10 days of the acquisition and a copy must be given to the
issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(d)(l) (1982).
17. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1472.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1473.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Also at that meeting, DREIA, controlled by First City Holdings, paid $200,000
to R-G Denver as a mutual release of liability.
23. Id. For a general discussion of tender offer litigation, see Loewenstein, Tender
Offer Litigation and State Law, 63 N.C.L. REV. 493 (1985).
[Vol. 64:2
COMMERICAL LA W
Great Western United Corp. ,25 held that there was no breach of agreement
where a contractual duty became inconsistent with fiduciary duties, re-
gardless of tortious interference.
26
R-G Denver's second cause of action was a claim for tortious inter-
ference with prospective business and economic advantage. 27 R-G Den-
ver asserted that First City Holdings' actions were in bad faith and that
the "now you see it, now you don't" tender offer was made with the
express intent of preventing the October fifteenth shareholder vote.
28
The trial court, granting summary judgment in favor of First City Hold-
ings, reasoned that First City Holdings' actions were within the bounds
of proper competition.
2 9
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Judge Cook, 30 writing for the Tenth Circuit, affirmed the trial
court's decision. The court enumerated five elements necessary to
prove a claim of tortious interference with a contract:
(1) an existing valid contract between plaintiff and a third
party; (2) knowledge by the defendant of this contract, or
knowledge of facts which should lead him to inquire as to the
existence of same; (3) intent by the defendant to induce a
breach of contract by the third party; (4) action by defendant
which induces a breach of the contract; and (5) damage to the
plaintiff.
3 1
The Tenth Circuit found that the instant case failed to meet all of these
elements and that the DREIA trustees had a clear fiduciary duty to in-
form their shareholders of the competing offers from First City
Holdings.
32
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that their decision was based
24. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Judge John P.
Moore presiding.
25. 200 Colo. 180, 613 P.2d 873 (1980). In Great Western, the board of directors of a
sugar-refining corporation, organized under Delaware law, entered into an agreement with
a group of sugar beet producers for the sale of Great Western's wholly owned subsidiary.
Under the agreement, Great Western was obligated to use its "best efforts" to obtain
shareholder approval of the sale. Although the Colorado Supreme Court held that under
Delaware law the "best efforts" obligation required Great Western to make a "reasonable,
diligent and good-faith effort" to secure shareholder approval, the "best efforts" clause
did not bind the board to continue recommending approval of the sale in the face of esca-
lating sugar prices. Approval of the sales agreement under these improved circumstances
would be detrimental to the shareholders, and accordingly, Great Western was not sanc-
tioned for eventually ceasing its efforts to obtain shareholder approval. Id. at 180-84, 613
P.2d at 874-76.
26. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1473.
27. Id. at 1475-76.
28. Id. at 1476.
29. Id. at 1476-77.
30. Honorable H. Dale Cook, ChiefJudge, United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. Other members of the court were Circuit
Judges Barrett and Anderson.
31. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1474 (citing Control, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 32 Colo. App. 384, 513 P.2d 1082 (1973)).
32. Id. at 1474-75.
1987]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
on prior case law. In an affirmation of the trial court's holding, Judge
Cook cited Great Western Producers Cooperative v. Great Western United
Corp. 33 where the Colorado Supreme Court held that there is no breach
of an agreement where a board of directors prioritizes its fiduciary du-
ties over its contractual obligations.3 4 The Tenth Circuit further rea-
soned that the R-G Denver/DREIA agreement was not breached by the
failure of the shareholders to conduct a vote on October 15, 1980. The
shareholder approval was merely a prerequisite to be satisfied before the
contemplated transaction could take place. Accordingly, it did not carry
the same consequences as an unfulfilled promise.
35
R-G Denver's second claim - tortious interference with prospec-
tive business and economic advantage - also fell on deaf ears. This
claim was supported by the assertion that First City Holdings' privilege
to compete was lost by its wrongful and improper conduct. The tort of
interference with a prospective business advantage has been previously
established.3 6 However, under these circumstances, the court simply
did not believe that First City Holdings' sole purpose was wrongful, in
bad faith or improper.
3 7
The Tenth Circuit further found that the only breach which may
have been induced was the failure of the shareholders to vote at the
October fifteenth meeting.3 8 However, that vote was not required re-
gardless of intervening events. Shareholder approval was a condition,
not a promise. Therefore, no actual breach - whether induced or not
- occurred. 3 9 The summary judgment of the district court was
affirmed.
C. Analysis
This decision upholds the basic principles of the free enterprise sys-
tem. Once a tender offer is made, the target company is essentially
placed upon an auction block. Shareholders are given the option of
choosing between bidders, and the board of directors has a fiduciary
33. 200 Colo. 180, 613 P.2d 873 (1980).
34. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1475 (relying on the analysis in Great Western, 613 P.2d at
878).
35. Id. at 1474.
36. Id. at 1476. See Dolton v. Capitol Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21 (Colo.
App. 1981). See generally Comment, Interference with a Prospective Business Relationship: An Old
Tort for the New Marketplace, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 123 (1983).
Colorado courts have adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(1) (1977),
which provides in pertinent part:
(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective
contractual relation with another who is his competitor . . . does not interfere
improperly with the other's relation if
(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the actor
and the other and
(b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and
(c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and
(d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the
other.
37. R-G Denver, 789 F.2d at 1477.




duty to inform the shareholders of all offers. The current trend of
"shark repellents ' 4 0 and "poison pills"' 4 1 may inhibit the initial offeror,
but for a company that wants to deter takeovers, once the initial offer is
made, there is nothing to prevent it from winding up on the auction
block, thereby allowing shareholders to take advantage of the highest
offer.
4 2
The principle of free market competition in tender offers was also
upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp.4 3 SCM, a prime target for a takeover, became the subject of a
bidding contest. SCM sought a preliminary injunction barring purchas-
ers, their officers, agents, and employees from acquiring shares in SCM
and also from exercising any voting rights with respect to shares previ-
ously acquired.
4 4
The Second Circuit acknowledged the legislative intent of the Wil-
liams Act,4 5 which was to avoid favoring either existing corporate man-
agement or outsiders seeking control through tender offers. The
Second Circuit stated that: "In this context the preliminary injunction,
which is one of the most drastic tools in the arsenal ofjudicial remedies,
must be used with great care, lest the forces of the free-marketplace,
which in the end should determine the merits of take over disputes, are
nullified." 
46
II. THE DISTINCTION IN APPLICABILITY BETWEEN "FORCE MAJEURE"
AND ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES WHEN SUPERVENING
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS AFFECT
PERFORMANCE UNDER A CONTRACT
In International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc. ,47 the Tenth
40. The expression "shark repellent" refers to the defensive tactic employed by some
vulnerable companies whereby stock repurchase programs are implemented in order to
strengthen the control of friendly shareholders. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 380 (1985). See, e.g., LTV v. Grumman Corp., 526 F. Supp. 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(corporation and pension plan made market purchases of more than I million shares of
corporation's own stock in a single day to prevent tender offeror from acquiring majority
control).
41. The term "poison pill," used to describe the most recent defensive mechanism in
the arsenal of corporate take over weapons, refers to preferred stock or warrants, issued by
the board of directors without shareholder approval. These new securities have the com-
mon characteristic that the rights of their holders are materially increased if any person
acquires more than a certain fraction of the corporation's common shares. R. HAMILTON,
CORPORATIONs 834 (3d ed. 1986); see, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985).
42. In a less positive vein, an argument could be made that this decision seems to
encourage non-disclosure of takeover offers and negotiations in an era where disclosure
has previously been encouraged, if not required. See Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185
(7th Cir. 1985); Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986); see aLso NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL § 202.05 (1983); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE
§ 401 (1983); NASD MANUAL Schedule D, Part II.
43. 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 50.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1), (6) (1982).
46. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 60.
47. 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985).
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Circuit reversed the district court and remanded with directions to allow
a buyer, under a "take or pay" natural gas requirements contract, the
protection of a payment-adjustment clause when the contract's "force
majeure" clause was deemed inapplicable due to the lack of timely noti-
fication to the seller. The buyer had raised the "force majeure" defense
when subsequently-enacted state environmental regulations resulted in
modification to the buyer's mine processing facility.
48
A. Factual Background
International Minerals and Chemical Corporation ("IMC") oper-
ated a potash mine and processing facility near Carlsbad, New Mexico.
4 9
Llano supplied IMC with the natural gas required to operate the mine's
processing facility.50 Under the contract, IMC was obligated to take, at
a minimum, a daily average of 4800 million Btu's of Llano's gas. 5 1 IMC
was further committed to pay for this minimum amount of gas, whether
it was accepted or not.5 2 The contract also contained a "force majeure"
clause, which provided for certain unexpected exigencies.
5 3
At the commencement of the contract, emissions from IMC's mine
were not regulated. However, in December 1978, the New Mexico Envi-
ronmental Improvement Board promulgated Regulation 508, 54 which
limited emissions from potash processing equipment. Compliance was
required "as expeditiously as practicable, and not later than December
31, 1982." 5 5 Following extensive study and testing, IMC determined
that its best hope for compliance with Regulation 508 was to experiment
with a "salting out process" 5 6 which required less gas consumption.
Llano was notified that IMC's gas consumption would be 50 to 60 per-
cent of normal usage during the testing period. 5 7 However, this notifi-
cation did not inform Llano that the reduction was in response to
environmental regulations, or that the reduced gas consumption might
48. See generally J. Becker, Force Majeure and State Intervention in U.S. Law, Ir'L Bus.
LAW, 283-86 (June 1985). See also Note, Force Majeure Clause as Defense In Gas Delivery Con-
tract, 112 PUB. UrsL. FORT. 60 (July 21, 1983).
49. International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 881.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 881-82. This is a typical "take and or pay" provision used throughout the
natural gas industry. The purpose is to compensate the seller for being ready to deliver at
all times, frequently at the exclusion of other customers. Id.; see also Utah Int'l, Inc. v.
Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 425 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Colo. 1976) ("take or pay" coal purchase
contract); Mobile Oil Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 387 F. Supp. 498 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
("take or pay" electricity contract).
53. International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 882, 885. The "force majeure" clause provided
that either party would be excused from performance if failure or delay in performance
was occasioned by events such as fire, flood, acts of God, or the interference of civil and/or
military authorities. The party seeking to be excused from performance was required to
provide immediate notice of all pertinent facts and to take reasonable steps to prevent the
problem. Further, the seller was to be entitled to six months' notice before the buyer
could be excused. Id.






become permanent due to a "force majeure" situation. 58
IMC was in compliance with Regulation 508 on March 20, 1981,
twenty-three months before the regulation deadline. As a result, during
the last eighteen months of the contract, IMC did not accept its mini-
mum obligation of gas from Llano.
5 9
IMC sought relief in the form of a declaratory judgment, hoping to
release the company from the contractual obligation to pay for the un-
used natural gas. Llano counterclaimed for the amount due under the
contract, $3,564,617.12.6o The trial court found that IMC was liable to
Llano for the full value of the gas not accepted, despite the fact that
Llano had been able to sell the gas elsewhere for a higher price than
IMC's purchase price. 6 1 The trial court reasoned that the U.C.C. doc-
trine of impossibility/impracticability, as codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. §
55-2-615 (1978),62 was not applicable in this case because, by its terms,
it applies only to sellers. 6 3 Additionally, the trial court based its deci-
sion on Official Comment 9,64 which limits the section's applicability to
buyers, "where the buyer's contract is in reasonable commercial under-
standing conditioned on a definite and specific venture or assump-
tion."'6 5 The trial court also held that the "force majeure" clause could
not excuse the buyer's contractual obligation unless Regulation 508 ab-
solutely prohibited IMC's daily purchase of 4800 million Btu's of gas.
6 6
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected IMC's argument for relief based upon
the "force majeure" clause. The court predicated its decision on two
factors: first, IMC's notice to Llano, stating its intention to decrease
consumption, was inadequate because no explanation of the environ-
mental issues was included; and second, Regulation 508 did not, in and
of itself, constitute an obstacle to IMC's ability to pay.
67
However, the Tenth Circuit found relief on another basis, allowing
58. Id. at 884.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 881.
61. Id. at 884.
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-615 (1978), titled "Excuse by failure of presupposed con-
ditions," provides in pertinent part:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section . . .on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or nondelivery in whole or in part by a seller ... is not a
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency, the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, or by compliance
in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid; ...
International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 885 n.2. For a discussion of § 2-615 of the U.C.C., see
Prance, Commercial Impracticability: A Textual and Economic Analysis of Section 2-615 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 19 IND. L. REV. 457-95 (1986).
63. International Materials, 770 F.2d at 885 n.2.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-615 (Official Comment 9, 1978).
65. International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 884.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 885.
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protection for IMC under the "minimum bill" or payment-adjustment
provision of the contract. This clause provided that, "in the event the
buyer is unable to receive gas as provided in the Contract for any reason
beyond the reasonable control of the parties, then an appropriate adjustment
in the minimum purchase requirements . . .shall be made."'6 8 Having
determined this provision to be applicable, the court then defined the
issue as: "[d]id the promulgation of Regulation 508 constitute an event
beyond the reasonable control of IMC that rendered IMC 'unable' to
receive its minimum amount of gas under the contract?"
6 9
The Tenth Circuit, in this circumstance, defined "unable" as being
synonymous with "impracticable," thereby allowing the court to take ad-
vantage of common law and statutory interpretations of "impracticabil-
ity." 70 In Wood v. Bartolino,7 1 the New Mexico Supreme Court, relying
on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981),72 described
the doctrine of impracticability as applying when "the promised per-
formance was . . .[made] impracticable owing to some extreme or un-
reasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss."' 73 The unanticipated
circumstances must make performance "vitally different from [the origi-
nal] contemplation of both parties." 74 The critical issue in applying the
doctrine of impracticability, as determined by the Third Circuit's hold-
ing in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission,7 5 is "whether the cost of
performance has in fact become so excessive and unreasonable that the
failure to excuse performance would result in grave injustice."
'76
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 (1981), and §
55-2-615 N.M. STAT. ANN., also allow for performance to be excused
when made impracticable by required compliance with a supervening
governmental regulation. This principle was illustrated in Kansas City,
Missouri v. Kansas City, Kansas,77 where the district court held that the
obligation of one city to accept another city's sewage was excused by the
enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
78
The Tenth Circuit found that there was "no technically suitable way
for IMC to comply" 79 with the environmental regulation without de-
creasing gas consumption, and therefore the payment-adjustment provi-
sion of the contract was properly triggered. The court said that the
adjustment clause should result in a minimum bill to IMC, based upon
68. Id. at 886 (emphasis in original).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 comment d (1981). For a general
discussion on the doctrine of impracticability, see D. Jacobs, Legal Realism or Legal Fiction?
Impracticability Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 87 CoM. L. J. 289-98 (1982).
73. Wood, 146 P.2d at 886.
74. Id. (quoting 6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1931 (1938)).
75. 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978).
76. Id. at 599.
77. 393 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
78. See also City of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 2d 710, 290 P.2d 841
(1955).
79. International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 886-87.
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the difference between IMC's minimum purchase obligation and the
value of the gas actually accepted.
8 0
Llano argued that there was no supervening impracticability be-
cause IMC was in final compliance with Regulation 508 long before the
required date. Llano contended that IMC should have delayed compli-
ance in order to take and use the gas as required by the contract. 8 ' The
court emphatically rejected this argument, first on public policy
grounds, and second "as a matter of law, [declaring that] government
policy need not be explicitly mandatory to cause impracticability."
'8 2
C. Analysis
In International Minerals, the court implicitly balanced the enforce-
ability of commercial contracts against the public need for environmen-
tal regulation. IMC was required by law to meet the standards of
Regulation 508 and as a good corporate citizen it endeavored to abide
by the law. If the court had additionally required IMC to fulfill its previ-
ous contractual obligations, the costs involved would have made compli-
ance with this type of governmental regulation an even more difficult
pill for the corporation to swallow.
It is important for the drafters of commercial contracts to include
both a "force majeure" clause and a payment-adjustment clause. These
clauses should be skillfully drafted in light of the contract they support,
the intentions of the contracting parties, and with a wary eye toward
unexpected future exigencies. The terms of the "force majeure" clause,
if triggered, will be strictly construed. If the "force majeure" clause is
deemed inapplicable, then the outcome of any dispute may likely be de-
termined by the underlying adjustment clause.
The actions of the corporation after execution of the contract, and
after some exigency has arisen, is also critical. IMC's mistake was in its
failure to fully notify Llano as to the reasons for its reduction in con-
sumption. As a result, the adjustment clause was triggered instead of
the "force majeure" clause. In the final analysis, however, equity was
served. IMC was not required to pay for gas which Llano never deliv-
ered and, in fact, sold elsewhere.
The applicability of a "force majeure" clause was similarly ex-
amined by the Second Circuit, in Phillips Puerto Rico Core, Inc. v. Tradax
Petroleum, Ltd.8 3 There, the Coast Guard's detention of a cargo ship did
not frustrate the purpose of the contract, nor did it prevent the buyer
from carrying out his obligation. The seller's only obligation was to de-
liver the goods to the carrier; any event that occurred after delivery to
the cargo ship was of no concern to the seller. Here, as in the Interna-
tional Minerals decision, the "force majeure" clause did not excuse
performance.
80. Id. at 887.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 782 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1985).
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III. PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAWS
In Ehat v. Tanner,84 the Tenth Circuit upheld the efficacy of 17
U.S.C. § 301 (a), 8 5 the federal copyright preemption statute, and denied
relief to an individual whose action was based on state common law
claims. The court reasoned that the common law rights were equivalent
to "exclusive rights" within the scope of the federal copyright statutes,
and were thus preempted.
A. Factual Background
Ehat was a scholar doing post-graduate research on the history of
the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (the LDS Church).
8 6
In the process of his research, Ehat took quotes from and made written
notations on the William Clayton Journals. 87 Ehat gave this information
to a colleague. The materials were surreptitiously taken from the col-
league's office, copied and returned.8 8 One of the unauthorized copies
was obtained by the Tanners, who blacked out Ehat's comments, repro-
duced the journal quotes and sold them to the public.8 9
Ehat's suit was based on a claim under the federal copyright stat-
utes, and on state common law claims for unfair competition and unjust
enrichment. 90 The trial court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants on the claim under the federal copyright statutes. 9 1 However,
a bench trial was conducted on Ehat's state common law claims and Ehat
prevailed. 92 The Tanners appealed and the Tenth Circuit reversed.
B. Legal Background
The Copyright Act of 197693 amended federal copyright law to pre-
empt state law. The amendment was intended to prevent "the States
from protecting .. .[a work] even if it fails to achieve federal statutory
copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or
84. 780 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 86 (1986).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982) provides:
On and afterJanuary 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or un-
published, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled
to any such rights or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State.
86. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 877.
87. William Clayton was the private secretary to Joseph Smith, the first president of
the LDS Church. The journals were maintained by Clayton between 1842 and 1846. Id. at
877 n. I.





93. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305, et seq. (1982); see supra note 85.
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because it has fallen into the public domain."' 94 In Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc.,95 the Supreme Court established that a state law for-
bidding others to copy an article "unprotected ...by a copyright ...
would interfere with the federal policy, found in art. I, section 8, cl. 8, of
the Constitution, and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave
in the public domain." 96
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,97 the Second
Circuit held that 17 U.S.C. § 301 preempted state common law or state
statutory claims when two conditions were present. First, the work in
question must be within the scope of the "subject matter of copyright"
as defined in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103;98 and second, the rights
granted under state law must be equivalent to any exclusive rights within
the scope of federal copyright as provided in 17 U.S.C. § 106.99 Rely-
ing on the parameters of Compco and Harper & Row, Judge Seymour ren-
dered the opinion for the Tenth Circuit.10 0
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Applying the criteria set forth under section 301, the court deter-
mined that Ehat's work was within the subject matter of the copy-
94. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 877 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5747).
95. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
96. Id. at 237; see also Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980).
97. 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
98. Copyright protection is afforded to "works of authorship," including:
(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dra-
matic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
and other visual works; and (7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). In addition, 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982) provides:
The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations
and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully.
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982) sets forth that:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) states:
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in
the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly.
See infra note 103; see also Schuchart & Assoc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D.
Tex. 1982); I.M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.01[B] at 1-19 (1985).
100. Seymour, Circuit Judge, authored the opinion for the three-judge panel including
Chief Justice Holloway and Judge Babcock.
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right,' 0 ' and that the state common law rights asserted by Ehat and the
exclusive rights encompassed by the federal copyright laws were
equivalent.' 0 2 Accordingly, Ehat's claims were denied.
In its decision, the court cited the federal copyright law, specifically
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) and (3), which create an exclusive right to the
owner of the copyright " 'to reproduce the copyrighted work' " and " 'to
distribute copies' " to the public for sale.' 0 3 However, the court noted
that Ehat's materials had not been copyrighted, nor was his claim based
upon any deprivation of rights in the works as "physical matter and
property."'1 0 4 Instead, Ehat's claims were for damages flowing from Tan-
ners' reproduction and distribution. 10 5 The court intimated that had
Ehat's cause of action been based on a state law claim of conversion -




Federal copyright law will preempt any state common law or statu-
tory claims which may fall within the "exclusive rights" scope of the
copyright law. One must carefully structure claims to be outside of this
scope when attempting to utilize state statutory or common law and,
even then, the likelihood for a successful outcome is uncertain.
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Piercing the Corporate Veil
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit reviewed two cases re-
garding piercing of the corporate veil. In McCulloch Gas Transmission Co.
v. Kansas-Nebrasha Natural Gas Co., 107 the Tenth Circuit refused, in an
alter ego situation,' 0 8 to pierce the corporate veil absent a showing that
failure to do so would "defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
101. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 878. "Literary works, including compilations and derivative
works, are within the subject matter of copyright if they are original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression." Id.; see supra note 98.
102. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 878.
103. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200.
When a right defined by state law may be abridged by an act which, in and of
itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights, the state law in question must be
deemed preempted .... Conversely, when a state law violation is predicated
upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or the like, the
rights involved are not equivalent and preemption will not occur.
Id.
104. Ehat, 780 F.2d at 878.
105. Id. The court's view of Ehat's claim was based in part on the $960 damages
awarded (improperly) by the trial court. This amount represented the Tanners' profit
from distribution of the copies. Id.
106. Id.
107. 768 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1985).
108. The alter ego doctrine fastens liability on the individual who uses a corporation
merely as an instrumentality to conduct his or her personal business, and such liability
arises from fraud or injustice perpetrated on persons dealing with the corporation. The
corporate form may be disregarded only where equity so requires. I W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
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fraud, or defend crime." 109 In Inryco, Inc. v. CGR Building Systems, Inc., 
0
the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite result and allowed a creditor to
pierce the corporate veil of an under-capitalized corporation.
1. McCulloch Gas Transmission Co. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas
Co. - The Alter Ego Situation
a. Factual Background
The McCulloch suit was the result of an alleged breach of a gas
purchase contract. In 1969, McCulloch Gas entered into a 20-year con-
tract with Northern Utilities."1I The contract contained a "take or pay"
clause which eventually came into dispute. 1 2 In August 1974, Northern
Utilities assigned the contract to Northern Gas. One month later, Kan-
sas-Nebraska Natural Gas Company acquired all the stock of Northern
Utilities and Northern Gas. It is not disputed that Kansas-Nebraska is
the alter ego of its wholly owned subsidiaries, Northern Utilities and
Northern Gas.' 13 In 1982, McCulloch Gas brought this breach of con-
tract action against Kansas-Nebraska and Northern Gas. The trial
court,' 14 relying on the alter ego relationship, pierced the corporate veil
of the wholly owned subsidiaries of Kansas-Nebraska. 1 15
b. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Russell, 1 6 re-
versed, holding that alter ego status alone is insufficient for piercing the
corporate veil. Instead, the court set forth a two-prong test. In addition
to a finding of alter ego - the first prong - the Tenth Circuit, relying
on Langdon v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 1 7 established a second prong requir-
ing a showing that failure to pierce the corporate veil would "defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime."
1 18
The instant case gave no indication that McCulloch would suffer any
hardship by a failure to pierce the corporate veil. 119 Therefore, the case
was reversed and remanded.
109. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1199, 1200.
110. 780 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1986).
111. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.
115. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200.
116. Sitting by designation, the Honorable David L. Russell, United States District
Judge for the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma. Other members of
the panel included Chief Justice Holloway and Judge McKay.
117. 625 P.2d 209, 213 (Wyo. 1981).
118. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200 (citing Langdon v. Lutheran Bhd., 625 P.2d 209
(Wyo. 1981)). The court in Langdon quoted 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 108. See also Wyo-
ming Constr. Co. v. Western Casualty and Sur. Co., 275 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 976 (1960); State v. Nugget Coal Co., 60 Wyo. 51, 144 P.2d 944 (1944).
119. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1201.
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c. Analysis
Generally speaking, courts are extremely reluctant to pierce the cor-
porate veil.120 The general rule, subject to various exceptions, has been
that a corporate entity will be recognized, not disregarded.' 2 1 This the-
ory will govern as long as it is utilized for legitimate purposes. 122 In the
past, the alter ego theory has been employed where the corporate entity
was used as a subterfuge. 12 3 In McCulloch, the Tenth Circuit has main-
tained the traditional reluctance to pierce the corporate veil by estab-
lishing an additional requirement of showing that if the corporate veil is
not pierced, the result will "defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime."1 24 The protective corporate shield, ab-
sent this showing, remains resilient.
2. Inryco, Inc. v. CGR Building Systems, Inc. - Notification of
Partnership's Creditors Required Upon Incorporation.
In contrast to the result reached in McCulloch Gas, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's Inryco decision allowed a creditor to pierce the corporate veil of an
under-capitalized corporation, thereby exposing the shareholders to lia-
bilities which they had incurred earlier as partners in a prior general
partnership.
a. Factual Background
CGR was originally formed in May of 1980, as a general partner-
ship. 125 The partnership's primary business was selling building sup-
plies. Soon after starting operations, CGR became a dealer for products
supplied by Inryco.1
2 6
The original CGR partnership interests were evenly divided in
thirds among the Reiman family and two other partners. 127 Inryco ex-
tended credit to CGR based upon the financial strength of the partners,
with particular reliance on the Reimans. In 1982, the other two partners
withdrew from CGR. 12 8 CGR then incorporated with little change in
operation; the same personnel, letterhead, logo and accounts were em-
ployed by the new corporation. 129 Additionally, at the time of incorpo-
120. H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS Or CORPORATIONS 344, 346 (3d ed. 1983).
121. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis.
1905).
122. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 473, 480-82 (1953).
123. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200 (quoting 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 108). See generally
Lopez, The Alter Ego Doctrine: Alternative Challenges to the Corporate Form, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
129 (1982); Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law,
95 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1982).
124. McCulloch, 768 F.2d at 1200.
125. Inryco, 780 F.2d 879, 880 (10th Cir. 1986).






ration, CGR had serious cash flow problems 130 and some corporate
formalities were not observed. Adequate books of accounts were not
maintained and the board of directors' meetings and shareholder meet-
ings were not held. 13 1 Moreover, although CGR had been instructed to
discuss all credit-related matters with a Mr. Petrie of Inryco, he never
received notice of CGR's incorporation.1
32
By 1983, CGR owed Inryco $40,000, of which $25,000 was incurred
after incorporation.13 3 Inryco brought suit to collect this debt,134 nam-
ing CGR Building Systems, Inc. and its three shareholders, the Reimans,
as defendants. There was no dispute that the Reimans were personally
liable for that part of the debt incurred under the general partner-
ship. 13 5 However, in addition to that amount, Inryco contended that
the CGR corporate veil should be pierced, and that the Reimans should
also be liable for the $25,000 debt incurred after incorporation. 13 6 The
trial court agreed with Inryco's contentions and entered judgment ac-
cordingly.' 3 7 The Reimans and CGR appealed.
b. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge William E.
Doyle, 13 8 affirmed the trial court decision. Relying on Wyoming case
law, the Tenth Circuit set forth a variety of factors to be considered
when determining the propriety of piercing the corporate veil. The
court said that each determination should be made on a case by case
basis in light of the particular facts presented therein.13 9 The separate
corporate identity will be disregarded, if necessary, to promote public
policy, to further justice, or to prevent unjust or inequitable conse-
quences.' 40 The court noted that actual corporate fraud is not required;
however, gross undercapitalization or complete domination of corpo-
rate affairs by individual shareholders will greatly increase the possibility
of the corporate veil being pierced.' 4 1 On this basis, the Tenth Circuit
130. Id. At incorporation, CGR "had approximately $1,500 in its checking account,
owned no assets of significant value, and had accounts payable far in excess of the com-
bined value of its assets." Id. at 882.
131. Id. at 881.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming,
Chief Judge Clarence A. Brimmer, Jr.
135. Inryco, 780 F.2d at 881.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 880. Inryco was awarded $39,999.76 by the trial court. Id.
138. Sitting as member of a three-judge panel comprised ofJudge Barrett, Judge Mc-
Williams and Judge Doyle.
139. Inryco, 780 F.2d at 881 (citing Yost v. Harpel, 674 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1983); Opal
Mercantile v. Tamblyn, 616 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1980)).
140. Yost, 674 P.2d at 712; AMFAC Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, 645 P.2d 73
(Wyo. 1982); Opal Mercantile, 616 P.2d at 776; Peters Grazing Ass'n v. Legerski, 544 P.2d
449 (Wyo. 1975), reh'g denied, 546 P.2d 189 (Wyo. 1976).
141. AMFAC Mechanical Supply, 645 P.2d at 79; State v. Nugget Coal Co., 144 P.2d 944
(Wyo. 1944); Caldwell v. Roach, 44 Wyo. 319, 12 P.2d 376 (1932). For a succinct analysis
of AMFAC Mechanical Supply, see Note, A Prima Fade Case for Piercing the Corporate Veil,
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determined that the trial court was correct in piercing the corporate
veil. 1
4 2
CGR had asserted that since notice of the incorporation was con-
veyed to Inryco's sales agent, Mr. Reedy, the corporate veil should not
be pierced, because Reedy's knowledge should be imputed to Inryco.143
At the time, however, Reedy was also a CGR shareholder. 14 4 Although
a general rule of agency law provides that the knowledge of an agent
may be imputed to his principal, 14 5 where an agent is found to have
engaged in transactions which are adverse to the principal, knowledge
or notice will not be imputed. 14 6 Reedy, with financial interests of his
own, failed to communicate notice of CGR's incorporation to Inryco
and, accordingly, the court did not impute notice.
14 7
c. Analysis
During the process of incorporating, and subsequent to actual in-
corporation, it remains of the utmost importance to strictly observe all
corporate formalities and to be adequately capitalized. 148 Additionally,
AMFAC Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, 645 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1982), 18 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 823 (1983).
142. Inryco, 870 F.2d at 882.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 883.
145. W. SEAVEY, AGENCY 174 (1964); see Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Hauf, 32
Wyo. 127, 230 P. 539 (1924). Generally speaking, corporations will be bound by knowl-
edge acquired by, or notice given to, its agents or officers which is within the scope of their
authority. American Standard Credit v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.
1981); Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970).
146. Inryco, 780 F.2d at 883 (citing Commercial Bank, 32 Wyo. at 129, 230 P. at 540); see
also SEAvEY, supra note 145, at 184.
147. Inyco, 780 F.2d at 883.
148. Provisions for adequate capitalization and the observance of proper corporate for-
malities will minimize the probability that the corporate entity will be disregarded. The
following checklist, recommended by David H. Barber in his article entitled "Piercing the
Corporate Veil," may assist the practitioner in maintaining a corporation's limited liability:
a. At the time of incorporation:
(1) file articles of incorporation with the proper state and local authorities;
(2) issue stock, providing certificates to all shareholders of record;
(3) provide at least the minimum capital required by law and make sure that all
subscribed shares are actually paid for;
(4) establish a separate bank account in the corporation's name.
b. After incorporation:
(1) hold the annual shareholders' meetings;
(2) hold regular meetings of the board of directors (also include a non-
shareholder on the board);
(3) keep accurate records of all such meetings;
(4) do not commingle corporate and personal funds;
(5) document all loans to the corporation by the shareholders - show the pur-
pose for the loan and the reason that funds were not obtained from outsiders;
(6) if possible, pay regular dividends which represent a reasonable return on
investment;
(7) always use the corporation's name in dealing with the public and require
that authorized parties sign all documents as agents for the corporation, stating
their relationship to the corporation.
c. Capitalization:
(1) document the reason for selecting a given capital structure, including any
comparable businesses studied (and past operating experience, if the entity was
established prior to incorporation);
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when transforming a partnership to a corporation, proper notice to all
creditors is imperative. 14 9 Failure to give notice of the incorporation
can expose individuals to personal liability, thereby defeating one of the
primary advantages of incorporation.
Other circuits have also dealt with this issue recently. The Eighth
Circuit, in Kapp v. Naturelle,150 considered a fact pattern where partners
in a partnership became the shareholders in a subsequent corporation,
and no notice of the incorporation was provided to the partnership's
creditors. The business carried on as it had as a partnership and main-
tained its original name, but with the addition of the word "com-
pany."' 15 1 In Kapp, the corporate veil was pierced and the individual
shareholders were estopped from denying personal liability. 152 The
Seventh and Sixth Circuits have reached similar decisions. 153 There-
fore, the Tenth Circuit's Inryco decision follows precedent from the
other circuits dealing with similar issues.
(2) provide a fixed maturity date and reasonable interest rate for any loan made
to the corporation by a shareholder;
(3) prior to incorporation, discuss the range of contemplated activities and spe-
cifically evaluate the reasonable risks of torts liability associated with the business,
document reasons for selection of the amount of liability insurance, and consult a
competent insurance broker for advice in assessing the risks and getting
insurance;
(4) provide all contracting parties with accurate financial data prior to any con-
tractual agreements;
(5) maintain a balance between debt and equity which is in line with the debt-
equity ratio of other businesses of the same type.
d. Other factors:
(1) avoid diversion of corporate assets or funds to shareholders, parent corpo-
rations, or related entities for other than corporate uses;
(2) do not allow any shareholders or agents of the corporation to represent that
they will be personally responsible for the obligations of the corporation;
(3) do not establish a separate corporation for conducting a single business ven-
ture (particularly one with high risk) unless adequate capital or insurance is pro-
vided for the venture;
(4) make the names of all shareholders available to those who deal with the
corporation.
Barber, Piercing The Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE L.J. 371, 402-03 (1981).
149. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. See generally 8 FLETCHER CYc. CORP.
§§ 4019-20 (1966).
150. 611 F.2d 703, 709 (8th Cir. 1979).
151. Id. at 705-06.
152. Id. at 709.
153. Kingsberry Homes v. Corey, 457 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1972); Northway Lanes v.
Hackley Union Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972); see also Melikian v.
Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274 (3d Cir. 1986), where the Third Circuit upheld the sufficiency of
a complaint which expressly alleged that corporate officers, through their single economic
enterprise, used a corporate form to defraud other parties to a contract for the sale of
corn. The case, which involved fraudulent misrepresentations of the corporation, resulted
in the piercing of the corporate veil and held the corporation's principals to be liable on a
judgment against the corporation for breach of the contract. Id. at 281. Cf Kashi v. Grat-
sos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1986) (principals held individually liable where they
participated in using corporation to perpetrate fraud while disregarding usual corporate
formalities).
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B. Criminal Liability of Corporations and Partnerships for Acts Committed
Prior to Dissolution
The case of United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc. 154 presented the
sole issue of whether dissolved corporations and partnerships may be
prosecuted for crimes committed prior to dissolution.
1. Factual Background
Mobile Materials, Inc. had been in the Oklahoma highway construc-
tion business since 1967.155 The Philpot brothers were the sole share-
holders, directors and officers of the corporation. 15 6 Additionally, these
two brothers did business as Mobile Materials Company, a general part-
nership. 157 Both the corporation and the partnership were dissolved in
1982, after Mobile was served with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a
grand jury investigating bid-rigging on Oklahoma highway construction
projects. In August of 1984, the grand jury returned indictments
against the partnership and corporation, and against one of the Philpot
brothers.158 The indictments included violations of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, 1 59 the mail fraud statute' 60 and the fraud and false statement
statute. 161
Mobile moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the compa-
nies had been formally dissolved before the indictments were returned.
The district court, 16 2 relying on United States v. Safeway Stores, 163 dis-
missed the action against both companies on grounds that criminal pro-
ceedings cannot be maintained against Oklahoma corporations and
partnerships which have been dissolved prior to indictment. 164
In Safeway Stores, the Tenth Circuit held that criminal prosecutions
were not encompassed by a California statute, similar to the Oklahoma
statute at issue in this case, which allowed for the continuation of a cor-
poration after dissolution "for the purpose of prosecuting and defend-
ing actions."' 6 5 In Safeway Stores, the court also determined that the
criminal prosecution exception was permissible under the corporate dis-
solution statutes of Nevada and Delaware. 166 Two subsequent cases,
United States Vanadium Corp. v. United States 167 and United States v. Line
Material Co.,168 had upheld the Safeway Stores decision, thereby abating
154. 776 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1986).
155. Id. at 1477.
156. Id.
157. Mobile Materials Company leased heavy equipment to Mobile Materials, Inc. Id.
158. Id.
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
162. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.
163. 140 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1944).
164. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1477.
165. Safeway Stores, 140 F.2d at 837.
166. Id. at 838.
167. 230 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1956) (criminal action abated upon dissolution).
168. 202 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953) (criminal action abated upon dissolution). But see
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criminal action against corporations upon dissolution.
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
In an opinion by Circuit Judge John P. Moore, the Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that Melrose Distillers v. United States, 169 overruled
Safeway Stores. In Melrose, the Supreme Court resolved the discrepancies
among the circuits and expanded the Maryland and Delaware statutes to
allow for the continued existence of dissolved corporations so that crim-
inal actions, pending under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, could pro-
ceed.170 It specifically rejected the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the
California statute discussed in Safeway Stores. 171 Mobile argued that Mel-
rose should not be dispositive because that indictment was handed down
prior to dissolution; in Safeway Stores and the instant case, the indictments
were handed down following dissolution. In spite of this distinction, the
Tenth Circuit found Melrose to be controlling and held that the indict-
ment against Mobile must stand. 172 The pivotal inquiry, according to
the court, is whether a statute implies "sufficient vitality" to post-disso-
lution corporate life to subject that corporation to criminal prosecu-
tion. 173 The language of the statute in question provided sufficient
vitality. 174
The Tenth Circuit justified expansion of the statute by interpreting
"actions," as it appears in the statute, 175 to include criminal prosecu-
tion. It also noted that the Oklahoma statute provided for service of
process on dissolved corporations. 176 Accordingly, the court reasoned
that the corporation could be criminally prosecuted.
Moreover, the court determined that the timing of the indictment
was not a deciding factor in the Melrose case. 177 As additional support,
the Tenth Circuit relied on Wewoka Petroleum Corp. v. Gilmore,' 78 where
United States v. P.F. Collier & Son Corp., 208 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1953) (reaching the
opposite result).
169. 359 U.S. 271 (1959).
170. Id. at 273-274.
171. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1478. "IfSafeway Stores retains any vitality, it is limited
to the proposition that corporate existence following dissolution must be determined
under state law." Id. Safeway Stores has also been rejected in several other cases. See
United States v. BBF Liquidating, Inc., 450 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972); United States v. San Diego Grocers Ass'n, 177 F. Supp. 352
(S.D. Cal. 1959).
172. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1478. Cf United States v. 2.61 Acres of Land, 791
F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1985) (where the court held that a delinquent corporation could not
bring suit, could not defend a legal action, and could not appeal an adverse ruling. How-
ever, once the corporate powers were reinstated, the corporation's existence was again
recognized and it was then permitted to defend such an action).
173. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1479.
174. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.188 (1981) provides that the corporate form remains in-
tact: "[F]or the purpose of winding up its affairs, prosecuting and defending actions by or
against it, and enabling it to collect and discharge obligations."
175. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1478 n.5.
176. Id. at 1479 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1.198b (1981)).
177. Id. at 1476.
178. 319 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1957).
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the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to dismiss a civil action which was
filed after the corporation dissolved.
One of the last factors cited by the Tenth Circuit in the Mobile Mater-
ials opinion was that of policy rationale. Noting that the Mobile indict-
ment was "not entirely unanticipated" and that dissolution was not
prevented by the threat of criminal prosecution, 179 the court concluded
that it would not be equitable to immunize a corporation from criminal
action by simply allowing dissolution.
3. Conclusion
One "escape hatch" of corporate liability, under Oklahoma law, has
been closed by this case: a corporation can no longer hide behind disso-
lution when seeking protection from criminal prosecution. 180 Further-
more, it is apparently irrelevant whether the indictment is handed down
before or after dissolution. 18 1
The Tenth Circuit's Mobile Materials decision should assist law en-
forcement personnel and prosecutors in their pursuit of corporate
criminals. To rule otherwise would probably create an atmosphere
where corporate criminals could advantageously rely upon the conven-
ience of dissolution any time they sought to avoid responsibility for their
illegal corporate acts.
V. BANKING
A. "Bank" vs. "Nonbank Bank ". Acquisition of a "Nonbank Bank" by an
Out-of-State Holding Company Under the Bank Holding Company
Act
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHCA")18 2 was enacted
to regulate federally chartered banks, so as to prevent the concentration
of commercial banking activities and to separate banking from com-
merce. 18 3 Among other things, the BHCA restricts the type of out-of-
state subsidiaries which a bank holding company may own. In Oklahoma
Bankers Association v. Federal Reserve Board,184 the Tenth Circuit examined
the subtle parameters governing a bank holding company's acquisition
of out-of-state subsidiaries.
1. Factual Background
The BHCA prohibits a bank holding company from acquiring a
179. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1480-81.
180. For a historical perspective on the evolution of corporation liability, see Brickley,
Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 393-423
(1982).
181. Mobile Materials, 776 F.2d at 1481.
182. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982).
183. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors, 668 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1981); see also S.
REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2482, 2483.
184. 766 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 64:2
COMMERICAL LA W
bank located in any state outside of the bank holding company's princi-
pal place of business. 185 Citicorp, the intervenor in this case, met the
definitional requirements for a bank holding company as set forth under
the BHCA. 186 With its principal place of business located in New York,
Citicorp sought to acquire an inactive Oklahoma trust company for the
purpose of operating subsidiary offices in Tulsa and Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. I8 7 The subsidiaries were to be known as Citicorp Savings
and Trust Company ("CSTC") and were to be managed from the offices
of Citicorp's existing consumer finance subsidiary, Citicorp Person to
Person, in New York. 18 8
In March 1983 Citicorp filed, with the Federal Reserve Board of
New York, its application to purchase the inactive Oklahoma trust com-
pany.' 8 9 Through CSTC, Citicorp proposed to offer de novo services,
consumer and commercial lending and thrift deposits. 190 However, in
an effort to avoid being categorized as a "bank" under the BHCA, Cit-
icorp sought "nonbank bank" status and submitted an application which
expressly stated that demand deposits or other transactional accounts
would not be accepted at CSTC. 19 1
The Oklahoma Bankers Association petitioned the Federal Reserve
Board in opposition to the Citicorp proposal, but the Board approved
Citicorp's application nonetheless, finding that CSTC's limited indus-
trial banking functions fell within the definition of a "nonbank bank"
185. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982). The statute provides that:
[N]o application . . . shall be approved under this section which will permit any
bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly,
any voting shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the assets of any
additional bank located outside the State in which the operations of such bank
holding company's bank subsidiaries were principally conducted on July 1, 1966,
or the date on which such company became a bank holding company, whichever
is later, unless the acquisition of such shares or assets of a State bank by an out-
of-State bank holding company is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the
State in which such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by
implication. [T]he State in which the operations of a bank holding company's
subsidiaries are principally conducted is that State in which total deposits of all
such banking subsidiaries are largest.
186. A "bank holding company" is defined as "any company which has control over
any bank .... 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982). A company is deemed to have control over
a bank if (1) it has the power, directly or indirectly, to vote 25 per centum or more of any
class of the bank's stock; (2) it controls - in any manner - the election of a majority of
the bank's directors; or (3) the Board determines that it exercises a controlling influence
over the bank's management or policies. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1982).
187. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1448.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The charter for one of Citicorp's proposed acquisitions listed industrial bank-
ing services which included the:
making or acquiring of loans and other extensions of credit, secured or un-
secured, for consumer and other purposes; the sale of credit related life and acci-
dent and health insurance by licensed agents or brokers, as required; the issuing
of thrift certificates and thrift passbook certificates; [and] the sale of consumer
oriented financial management courses.
48 FED. REG. 14,756 (1983). "Thrift certificates" are defined as "fixed time certificates,
redeemable only after a minimum maturity period." Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1448.
191. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1448.
19871
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
under the BHCA. 192 Oklahoma Bankers brought this action after failing
to convince the Board that its approval of Citicorp's application should
be reversed. Citicorp joined as an intervenor.
193
Oklahoma Bankers raised two primary objections to Citicorp's pro-
posed acquisition and CSTC's designation as a "nonbank bank." First,
the association alleged that CSTC was actually a bank under the BHCA,
based upon a theory that characterized CSTC's thrift certificates as de-
mand deposits. 19 4 Second, Oklahoma Bankers contended that since
Oklahoma banking law permits trust companies to accept demand de-
posits, CSTC must necessarily be a bank under the BHCA.I
9 5
The BHCA defines a bank as "[1] an institution which makes com-
mercial loans and [2] accepts 'deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand.' "196 Oklahoma Bankers contended that
the thrift deposit accounts offered by CSTC qualified as "demand de-
posits" under section 2(c), and that, accordingly, Citicorp should not be
granted "nonbank bank" status. 19 7 Citicorp admitted that CSTC in-
tended to make commercial loans, thereby fulfilling the first require-
ment of the BHCA's two-part "bank" definition. Accordingly, the
primary issue became whether the thrift deposit accounts were deemed
to be "demand deposits" as argued by Oklahoma Bankers. If this was
the case, then the second criteria would also be fulfilled, and CSTC
would be a "bank" under section 2(c).19 8
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Judge Seth, writing for the three-judge panel,19 9 rejected the argu-
ments raised by Oklahoma Bankers and affirmed the decision of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board.20 0 The court noted that for the purposes of federal
regulation Congress has narrowed the BHCA's original definition of a
"bank," 20 1 and that in recent years numerous institutions have qualified
for "nonbank bank" status under the exceptions created by Con-
gress. 2 02 The court stated that "[fWederal law under the non-bank ex-
ception . . .expressly envisions the operation of industrial banks in
192. Id. at 1449.
193. Id. at 1446.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1450 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 1001(A)(1) (1981)). Oklahoma Bankers
raised this claim even though Citicorp's proposal stated that demand deposits would not
be accepted by CSTC. Id. at 1448.
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982) (emphasis added by the Tenth Circuit).
197. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449.
198. Id.
199. The panel included Judge Holloway, Judge McWilliams and Judge Seth.
200. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1446.
201. On two occasions Congress has modified the definition of a "bank" under the Act.
Originally, the definition included all national banks, state banks and savings banks. Act of
May 9, 1956, ch. 240, § 2(c), 70 Stat. 133. The definition was narrowed in 1966 to govern
only those domestic institutions which "[accept] deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand." Act of July 1, 1966, § 3, 80 Stat. 236, 237. The current
definition was enacted in 1970. See supra note 196 and accompanying text; see also Wilshire,
668 F.2d at 733.
202. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449 (citing the Tenth Circuit's earlier decision in
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Oklahoma by out-of-state bank holding companies. ' 20 The Tenth Cir-
cuit also affirmed the Board's finding that the limited functions of CSTC
qualified it for "nonbank bank" status.
20 4
The court specifically rejected Oklahoma Bankers' first conten-
tion, 20 5 and held that the thrift certificate deposits proposed by Citicorp
to be offered by CSTC were not demand deposits under the BHCA. 20 6
"Demand deposits" are defined as those which "the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand.''207 Utilizing a theory similar to the one
employed by the Federal Reserve Board, the court determined that
CSTC's thrift deposits were not payable upon demand. 20 8 In First Ban-
corporation v. Board of Governors,2 09 the Tenth Circuit reached a similar
determination regarding interest-bearing "NOW" accounts. 2 10 The de-
terminative factor in both First Bancorporation and Oklahoma Bankers is
whether a restriction exists on the immediate withdrawal of a depositor's
money. 2 1 1 In First Bancorporation, the restriction was statutory; in
Oklahoma Bankers, it was contractual.
In First Bancorporation, Utah law specifically required industrial loan
companies to reserve the right to demand notice from a depositor prior
to withdrawal. 2 12 Oklahoma law, however, is silent on this issue, and
Oklahoma Bankers contended that this loophole would allow depositors
to make immediate, transactional-type withdrawals from the Citicorp
subsidiaries. However, the court acknowledged that Citicorp's applica-
tion expressly stated that CSTC's thrift certificate deposits would be
governed by "specific, legally enforceable, contractual agreements" ex-
plicitly requiring depositors to provide CSTC with 14 or more days no-
tice prior to withdrawal. 2 13 The court upheld the enforceability under
Oklahoma law of this restrictive type of private contractual arrangement
Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 774 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), af'd, 106 S.
Ct. 681 (1986)).
203. Id. at 1451. The court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and observed
that the Senate Banking Committee chairman, Senator A. Willis Robertson, stated that a
1966 amendment to section 2(c) of the Act "clearly exclude[d] industrial banks" from
definition as a "bank." 112 CONG. REC. 12386 (June 6, 1966) (statement of Sen.
Robertson).
204. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449.
205. See supra text accompanying note 194.
206. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1450.
207. Id. at 1449 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982) (emphasis added by the Tenth
Circuit)).
208. Id. at 1450.
209. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
210. Id. at 435. "NOW" account is an acronym for "negotiable order of withdrawal"
account. ld.
211. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449-50.
212. First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 436. Accord, Pennsylvania Bankers Ass'n v. Secre-
tary of Banking, 481 Pa. 332, 392 A.2d 1319 (1978) (drafts were not "payable on demand"
and not considered "checks" under the Uniform Commercial Code where NOW accounts,
offered by savings bank, required depositors to give 14 day notice prior to withdrawal or
payment of a draft); Savings Bank of Baltimore v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 461, 237 A.2d 45
(1968) (accounts subject to withdrawal by check, which required 30 day notice prior to
withdrawal, negated assumption that such accounts could be characterized as "demand
deposits").
213. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449.
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between a depositor and a financial institution, 21 4 and concluded that
such an agreement would prohibit depositors from withdrawal upon de-
mand.2 15 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit upheld the Board's finding
that the thrift certificates were not demand deposits, and CSTC avoided
being characterized as a "bank" under the BHCA.
2 t 6
The court also rejected Oklahoma Bankers' second contention that
since Oklahoma banking law permits trust companies to "receive depos-
its of trust monies" 2 17 which are withdrawable upon demand, a trust
company such as CSTC is clearly a "bank" under the BHCA.2 18 The
court agreed that the Oklahoma trust charters sought by CSTC permit-
ted traditional banking services to be offered,2 t 9 and it acknowledged
the opinion of the Oklahoma bank commissioner who characterized
trust deposits as being withdrawable upon demand. 22 0 Despite these
acknowledgments, the court stood by its previously stated pronounce-
ment from Dimension Financial Corp.
We no longer look to the possible powers an institution may
exercise under a state charter but rather decide whether it
meets both the deposit and commercial lending elements of the
statutory test. An organization which has voluntarily limited its
functions in order to conform to the Act's definition of a non-
bank simply cannot use all the powers granted by a state
charter.
2 21
On its own initiative, Citicorp's CSTC application specifically re-
frained from including the full menu of traditional banking services,
2 2 2
thereby complying with the limitations imposed by the statute. In addi-
tion, the Tenth Circuit further noted that, despite the fact that the trust
charter granted CSTC the power to offer traditional banking services,
the approval of Citicorp's CSTC proposal by the Federal Reserve Board
carried with it no right to exercise traditional banking power.2 23 The
Board's order allowed CSTC to operate as a "limited purpose industrial
bank," restricted to the services permitted by nonbank banks. 224 Any
violation of these restrictions or any alteration or expansion of CSTC's
214. Id. at 1449-50. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Anderson, 120
Okla. 194, 250 P. 1018, 1019 (1926), that a deposit "may be subject to any agreement
which the depositor and the bank may make with respect to it."
215. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1449-50.
216. Id. at 1450.
217. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 1001(A)(1) (1981)).
218. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1450.
219. Id. "The powers granted to trust companies by Oklahoma law are substantially
similar to the powers granted banks." Id. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 402 (1981) with
OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 1001 (1981) (Banks and trust companies are granted the same general
powers under these statutes.).
220. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1450.
221. Id. (citing Dimension Fin. Corp., 774 F.2d at 1404). For a critical analysis of Dimen-
sion see Note, Nonbank Banks: Who's Minding the Store? 46 LA. L. REV. 1087 (1986); Com-
ment, Banking Law: A Bank is a Bank is a Bank: Dimension Financial Services v. Board of
Governors, 11J. CORP. L. 277 (1986).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 190 and 191.




limited areas of operation, would result in an enforcement action by the
Board.
22 5
The court also considered and rejected Oklahoma Bankers' allega-
tions that the services to be offered by CSTC failed to meet the BHCA's
requirements of (1) being closely related to banking and (2) benefiting
the public. 2 26 A list of activities deemed to be "closely related" to bank-
ing is codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a). 22 7 The Tenth Circuit found the
services proposed by Citicorp to be within these statutory bounda-
ries. 2 28 The court also determined that CSTC could "reasonably be ex-
pected to produce benefits to the public." '22 9 The court rejected
Oklahoma Bankers' contention that Citicorp's sheer size alone could
produce monopolistic tendencies that would be detrimental to the pub-
lic good. 230 Moreover, this theory had been previously struck down in
Connecticut Bankers Association v. Board of Governors.23 1 Congress has not
established aggregate size as a factor for the Board to weigh. 232 In-
stead, the court considered the public benefit issue within the scope set
forth by Congress. 23 3 After weighing "public benefit factors such as
'greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency,'
against 'possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of re-
sources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or un-
sound banking practices,' ",234 the Tenth Circuit agreed with the
determination of the Federal Reserve Board that CSTC's operation in
Oklahoma would benefit the public.
2 35
225. Id. Enforcement actions are brought under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3) (1982). "The
Board is authorized to issue such regulations and orders as may be necessary to enable it
to administer and carry out the purposes of this chapter and prevent evasions thereof." 12
U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982); see Wilshire, 668 F.2d at 738 (discussion of enforcement
considerations).
226. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1451-52 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
227. "Closely related" activities include:
(1) Making or acquiring . . . loans and other extensions of credit . . . such as
would be made, for example, by a mortgage, finance, credit card, or factoring
company;
(2) Operating as an industrial bank... in the manner authorized by State law so
long as the institution does not both accept demand deposits and make commer-
cial loans;
(3) Servicing loans and other extensions of credit for any person; and
(4) Acting as insurance agent or broker in offices at which the holding company
or its subsidiaries are otherwise engaged in business ....
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(l)-(3), (9) (1983). The Federal Reserve Board's determination of
which activities are "closely related" to banking is entitled to the "greatest deference."
Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56 (1981).
228. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1450-51.
229. Id. at 1451 (quoting the statutory language of 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
230. Id. Citicorp is the second largest commercial banking organization in the United
States, with total consolidated assets of $130.2 billion. The largest Oklahoma bank hold-
ing company has total consolidated assets of $3 billion. Id.
231. 627 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
232. Western Bancshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 480 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1973).
233. Oklahoma Bankers, 766 F.2d at 1451.
234. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
235. Id.
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3. Conclusion
It may be argued, at least from the perspective of the Oklahoma
Bankers Association, that the distinction between a "bank" and a "non-
bank bank" is merely one of semantics. Although the BHCA was en-
acted, in part, to prevent the "concentration of commercial banking
activities,"-23 6 the Tenth Circuit's decision does not appear to support
this meritorious goal. By affirming the Federal Reserve Board's decision
to allow Citicorp to offer numerous financial services in Oklahoma (al-
beit no transactional type accounts), the court has indeed created an-
other participant in the local banking marketplace - the industrial bank
operating as a nonbank bank. 23 7 Although Citicorp will not compete
"service for service" with local Oklahoma banks, 238 several avenues of
competition will be opened by Citicorp's entry into the marketplace, es-
pecially in the realm of consumer and commercial lending. Addition-
ally, some deposits heretofore invested with local, small town banks will
undoubtedly find their way to the coffers of Citicorp's CSTCs.
From the consumer's point of view, at least for the short term, the
increased competition may be welcomed. 2 39 In the long run however,
and from the perspective of the small town banker, the decision in
Oklahoma Bankers poses a threat. It represents another hurdle for the
local bank to overcome and thereby makes moot the lofty ideals of the
BHCA.240 In an era when rural small town banks are struggling to hold
on - in the face of depressed oil prices and decreasing farm product
prices - the Tenth Circuit's decision is likely to be viewed with skepti-
cism by the small town banker in Oklahoma. To him, the distinction
between "bank" and "nonbank bank" is irrelevant.
B. Limitations on the Ultra Vires Defense
1. Ries Biologicals, Inc. v. Bank of Santa Fe
In Ries Biologicals, Inc. v. Bank of Santa Fe, 24 t the Tenth Circuit held
that a bank may not employ the shield of the ultra vires242 defense when
its guarantee to pay the debts of a third party is made to benefit the
pecuniary interests of the bank.
236. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
237. For a critical discussion of the contradictory policy considerations surrounding
nonbank banks, see Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks - An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 Bus. LAw 99-
123 (1985).
238. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
239. For an article illustrating the consumer advantages derived from nonbank banks,
see L.A. Daily Journal,Jan. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 6. Cf Victor, Nonbank Bank Options Get Mixed
Reviews, Legal Times, June 10, 1985, at 2, col. 1.
240. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
241. 780 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986).
242. "Ultra vires" refers to acts beyond the scope or in excess of the legal power or
authority vested in a corporation, an official, or a legislative body. BLACK's LAw DICTION-




Ries Biologicals was a distributor of medical supplies. 2 4 3 One of
Ries' customers, Dialysis Management Systems, Inc. ("DMS"), was a
health care provider specializing in kidney dialysis.2 4 4 During the time
in question, DMS was experiencing financial problems and had out-
standing loans with its bank, the Bank of Santa Fe, in excess of
$620,000.245 DMS was also delinquent on payments due to Ries. When
DMS's outstanding balance with Ries reached $42,000, Ries notified
DMS that all future orders to DMS would be shipped on a C.O.D. basis
only. 24 6 A few months later, however, Mr. Levitt, a senior vice president
for the Bank of Santa Fe, made an oral agreement with Ries to guarantee
payment by the bank of all DMS orders approved by the bank in advance
of shipment. 24 7 Relying on Mr. Levitt's oral guarantee, Ries resumed
shipments of medical supplies to DMS. All orders were approved in ad-
vance and all invoices were sent directly to Mr. Levitt at the bank.
2 48
Despite the oral guarantee and Ries' full compliance with Mr. Lev-
itt's instructions, Ries was not paid in full for medical supplies shipped
to DMS. Ries filed suit against the bank, and the trial court 24 9 entered
judgment in favor of Ries for approximately $27,000, together with
costs and attorneys' fees. 250 On appeal, the bank denied liability and
asserted, among other things, that Ries' claim was barred by the New
Mexico statute of frauds, 25 ' and that the oral guarantee of Mr. Levitt
was void as an ultra vires act.
2 52
b. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Judge Crow,2 5 3 writing for the Tenth Circuit, affirmed the lower
court decision. 2 54 The court held that the New Mexico statute of frauds
did not prohibit Ries' recovery, despite the fact that an oral agreement
243. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 890.
244. Id.
245. Id. $500,000 of this amount was guaranteed by the Small Business Administra-
tion. However, the trial court found that the bank still had a substantial amount outstand-
ing at great risk. Id. at 891.
246. Id. at 890.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
250. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 890.
251. The New Mexico statute of frauds provides that:
"[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforcea-
ble ... unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale
has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought .... "
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-201 (1978).
252. In addition to its primary contentions, the bank also raised evidentiary and ac-
counting issues. The Tenth Circuit quickly disposed of those issues. Ries Biologicals, 780
F.2d at 890-91.
253. Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas,
sitting by designation. Other members of the panel were judge Holloway andJudge Seth.
254. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 889, 892; see also Martin Roofing, Inc. v. Goldstein, 469
N.Y.S.2d 595 (1983) (enforceability of oral guarantees).
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to guarantee the debts of a third party is not ordinarily enforceable. 2 5
5
The statute of frauds will not apply, the court said, where "the main
object of the agreement is to serve pecuniary interests of the prom-
isor. ' '2 56 In addition, the court relied on Aragon v. Boyd,25 7 which held
that full performance by one side is sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds.
The bank also failed to escape liability under its ultra vires theory.
The court refused to deny Ries' right to recovery on the bank's conten-
tion that Mr. Levitt's oral guarantee was a violation of the bank's statu-
tory powers. 2 58 The court pointed out that "[t]he New Mexico Supreme
Court has held that a bank may not avoid a guarantee as ultra vires where
the transaction is for the bank's benefit in the furtherance of legitimate
banking business." 25 9 The Tenth Circuit found that the Bank of Santa
Fe's involvement in the activities of DMS was an effort to prevent bank
losses which would result from a DMS failure. According to counsel for
the Bank of Santa Fe, the bank would not have become so involved if no
incidental benefit could be received.2 60 Therefore, the court rejected
the bank's attempt to avoid payment.
c. Conclusion
Ries Biological stands for the simple proposition that a bank may not
hide behind an ultra vires defense when the bank's guarantee to pay the
debts of a third party is made for the overall benefit of the bank.
2 6 1
Under the circumstances in Ries Biologicals, the outcome of this case is
the only one which is equitable. To allow the Bank of Santa Fe the op-
tion of raising an ultra vires defense anytime a guarantee goes sour,
would be to create havoc in the business marketplace. Similarly, suppli-
ers like Ries should be entitled to rely on a bank's guarantee made by a
senior vice-president. Banks must be cognizant of the guarantees they
make, and the standards for extending those guarantees should be the
same as for other banking agreements which are clearly not ultra vires.
Molly Myer
255. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 891. The rule was stated in Beacon Supply Co. v.
American Fiber Corp., 75 N.M. 29, 35, 339 P.2d 927, 931 (1965), however, in Beacon no
benefit was found for the promisor and that statute of frauds was enforced.
256. Abraham v. H.V. Middleton, Inc., 279 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1960). The pecuniary
interests of the promisor, the Bank of Santa Fe, were significant. Only $500,000 of the
$620,000 owed by DMS to the bank was guaranteed by the Small Business Administration.
The remaining $120,000 was unsecured. Accordingly, the bank had a substantial interest
in getting DMS back to profitability. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 891.
257. 80 N.M. 14, 450 P.2d 614 (1969).
258. Ries Biologicals, 780 F.2d at 891.
259. Id. (citing Ellis v. Citizen's Nat'l Bank of Portales, 25 N.M. 319, 183 P. 34 (1918)).
260. Id. at 891.
261. Id.
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